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This chapter examines the tradeoffs of regulating upstream (e.g., coal, natural gas, and refined petroleum
product producers) versus regulating downstream (e.g., direct sources of greenhouse gases (GHG)).
In general, regulating at the source provides polluters with incentives to choose among more opportunities
to abate pollution. This chapter develops a simple theoretical model that shows why this added flexibility
achieves the lowest overall costs. I broaden the theory to incorporate several reasons why these potential
gains from trade may not be realized--transactions costs, leakage, and offsets--in the context of selecting







This chapter examines the tradeoﬀs of regulating greenhouse gases (GHG) upstream versus
downstream. Upstream regulation focuses on ﬁrms producing or importing raw materials
that contain GHG like coal, natural gas, and reﬁned petroleum products. In contrast,
downstream regulation typically refers to regulating the direct sources of GHG including
motor vehicles, farms, power plants, and other stationary sources. The implications of which
sectors to target will depend on four issues discussed below: cost eﬀectiveness, transactions
costs, leakage, and oﬀsets.
Before examining these issues, this chapter explores the terms “upstream” and “down-
stream.” Regulation may occur at many diﬀerent segments of a vertical chain. For this
reason, I will refer to the choice of upstream versus downstream regulation as one of regu-
latory vertical segment selection, or vertical targeting. Some industries have short chains,
w h i l eo t h e r sh a v em a n yl i n k s .
For example, consider the regulation of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from personal
vehicles. The chain begins with worldwide exploration and extraction of crude oil. Firms
extract most of the oil used for US transportation internationally. The US only produces a
third of the oil that it consumes (Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2008). In the
second vertical segment, ﬁrms transport crude by pipeline or tanker. Third, the oil reaches a
reﬁnery, most likely one of the 150 reﬁneries in the US. Imports account for approximately
12 percent of US motor gasoline consumption (EIA, 2008). Fourth, after reﬁning the
crude oil into motor gasoline, the product moves, typically by pipeline, to about 390 major
wholesale racks.1 Fifth, trucks bring it to approximately 105,000 US gasoline stations
(Census, 2010). Sixth, consumers purchase and pump the gasoline into over 244 million
private and commercial registered motor vehicles in the US (Department of Transportation,
2009). While ﬁrms and consumers release CO2 emissions in all six links, in this case, the
vast majority occurs during consumption of the ﬁnal product.
This example illustrates two points regarding vertical targeting. First, the number of
ﬁrms or consumers involved in each step may diﬀer dramatically. As discussed below, opti-
mal regulation occurs at the pollution source (assuming an otherwise functioning market).
However, the number of reﬁneries pales in comparison to the number of registered vehicles.
1OPIS collects wholesale gasoline and diesel prices for over 390 racks (http://www.opisnet.com/rack.asp
accessed April 15, 2010).
2If few opportunities exist to abate CO2 downstream of reﬁning—namely if wholesale racks,
gasoline stations, and motor vehicles cannot sequester some of the carbon content in the
gasoline at marginal costs equal to or below carbon prices—then regulating at the reﬁnery
level will result in small losses in cost eﬀectiveness from potential trades but great savings
in transactions costs.
Second, the terms “upstream” and “downstream” do not deﬁne a speciﬁc vertical seg-
ment. The upstream industry could mean any one of several industries. In this example,
upstream typically refers to reﬁneries, while downstream refers to vehicles. However, in
other contexts, “upstream” might mean the polluters and “downstream” might mean con-
sumers. For example, in electricity markets, upstream regulation targets power plants while
downstream refers to regulating retailers, the Load Serving Entities (LSEs). Downstream
regulation would require estimating the source of electricity for each LSE and using a carbon
price at that level of the vertical chain. The terminology of upstream and downstream
must be understood in context. This chapter aims to address: (i) why, in a general setting,
regulating polluters directly maximizes social welfare, and (ii) why this might not apply for
carbon policy.2 In particular, if policies do not target polluters, would a regulation upstream
of the pollution source be more cost eﬀective, or would a downstream one be preferred?
In the sections below, I develop a theoretical model that explains why regulating the
source of pollution lowers abatement costs. In particular, if ﬁrms can reduce emissions
at the end of the pipe, upstream regulations may miss these options. Next I discuss three
mechanisms that may aﬀect regulators choice of vertical targeting and how one could account
for them in determining a least cost policy. First, transactions costs from monitoring
and enforcing regulations diﬀer dramatically along the vertical chain given the number of
consumers or producers involved at each segment. Second, while policy discussions include
concerns of leakage, I note how the choice of vertical targeting will aﬀect the degree of
leakage. Namely, the supply elasticity of unregulated ﬁrms varies by segment. Last, if
the point of regulation lies upstream of the pollution source, oﬀsets can reward ﬁrms for
choosing to abate downstream. I discuss how these oﬀset programs may aﬀect the total
costs of a regulation for a given vertical chain. Many consider oﬀs e t st op r o v i d eat r a d e o ﬀ:
lower abatement costs but increase total emissions. I show that oﬀsets may even increase
2For simplicity, I will refer to all GHG emissions and regulations as carbon emissions and carbon policy,
respectively. See the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (Solomon et al.,
2007) for an explanation of the science of converting various GHG emissions into carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions.
3both costs and emissions. Taking account for all four aspects of vertical targeting—cost
eﬀectiveness, transactions costs, leakage, and oﬀsets—this chapter provides a model of how
costs vary along a vertical chain. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of other
potential issues with vertical targeting and a summary of the main ﬁndings.
2 Theory of Cost Eﬀectiveness
This section examines the relative cost eﬀectiveness of upstream versus downstream regula-
tion.3 Suppose that ﬁrm i produces a single good that results in carbon emissions. The ﬁrm
maximizes proﬁts π with respect to its output q, the carbon content of its fuel F (measured




π = P(Q)q − c(q) − a(q,F,r), (1)
where the price of the good sold (P) depends on the total industry output Q,a n dﬁrm costs
are denoted c(q) for production (given no carbon regulation) and a(q,F,r) for abatement.
Note that Frequals the typical emissions rate deﬁnition. For a given competitive quantity-
choosing environment, an unregulated ﬁrm will set marginal revenue (MR ≡
∂P(Q)q
∂q )e q u a l
to marginal cost (MC ≡ c0(q)) and not abate: r =1 ,a=0 .
Next I write a(q,F,r) as two additive components: ain(q,F) depending only on inputs,
and aout(q,F,r) for “end-of-pipe” technologies. Switching to a lower carbon fuel (for exam-
ple, a vehicle switching from oil-based diesel to biodiesel, or a power plant switching from
coal to natural gas) would be in ain. aout includes other technologies, like installing carbon
capture and sequestration (CCS) technology on a power plant, but also any other type of
a b a t e m e n td e c i s i o nt h a tw o u l dn o tb ec o v e r e db yc h a n g i n gi n p u t s . F o re x a m p l e ,i far e ﬁnery
changed the product mix to produce more asphalt (which would sequester carbon), then this
would also be part of aout.
Consider two possible regulations: a carbon price as an input-based regulation tin;a n da
carbon price as an end-of-pipe regulation τout.W e c a n r e w r i t e t h e ﬁrm’s objective function
3This chapter relates to several literatures. Schmalensee (1976) compares upstream versus downstream
welfare measurements of input-based taxes. The environmental costing literature notes the practical im-
portance of making both inputs and outputs reﬂect social costs (Smith, 1992). Burrows (1977) modeled the
input substitution implications of pollution taxes relative to standards. Carlton and Loury (1980) consider
the entry and exit implications of taxation policy.
4in equation (1) as:
max
q,F,r
π = P(Q)q − c(q) − tinFrq − τoutFrq− ain(q,F) − aout(q,F,r), (2)
where r corresponds to the emissions rate of the ﬁrm’s unregulated fuel choice. As mentioned
above, an unregulated ﬁrm would not abate, r =1 . In this setting, I write the ﬁrst order
conditions as:
q : tinF + τoutFr= MR− c
0(q) − ∂ain/∂q − ∂aout/∂q, (3)
F : tinq + τoutrq = −∂ain/∂F − ∂aout/∂F, (4)
r : τoutFq= −∂aout/∂r. (5)
Ac o s t - e ﬀective regulation would allow ﬁrms to use any means of abating pollution,
whether it be end of pipe, input based, or just producing less output. In this case, the
regulator would need to be able to monitor the actual emissions rate, r. When feasible, like
in the case of power plants that use a Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS),
ﬁrms will choose among all possible ways of reducing carbon. To enact this, regulators
would set tin =0and, if socially optimal, τout = MD, the marginal damages from carbon
emissions.4 From equations (3), (4), and (5), we see that ﬁrms have an incentive to reduce
pollution on all margins, and to continue to abate until the carbon price τout equals the
marginal abatement cost (MAC):















All regulated ﬁrms would have similar incentives. Hence, the marginal cost of abatement
will be equal across all techniques and all ﬁrms: the result being cost eﬀective.
In contrast, an input-based regulation would set τout =0and, in order to be allocatively
eﬃcient, tin = MD.5 In this case, from equation (5) we see that ﬁr m sh a v en oi n c e n t i v et o
abate using end-of-pipe technologies. Furthermore, only under an end-of-pipe regulation,
the marginal abatement cost from reducing output or changing inputs depends on the choice
4Under a tax, regulators would levy a tax τout while under a cap-and-trade regulation, permits would be
auctioned or grandfathered such that the expected permit price equals τout.
5This section looks at extremes of regulating only one vertical segment. However, some combination
of upstream and downstream policies could provide incentives for lowering abatement costs but also keep
transactions costs low (for example, see Fullerton and Wolverton (2000)). The discussion of oﬀsets revisits
this issue.
5of r. While ﬁrms will still have incentives to reduce output and improve the carbon content
of fuels, some opportunities to abate will be forgone. In equilibrium, all ﬁrms would set:












If such an approach had been used for sulfur dioxide regulation twenty years ago, ﬁrms
would only have incentive to switch to low-sulfur coal and not to install scrubbers. Given
the number of scrubbers that have been installed because of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments, an input-based regulation may have been quite costly in that case. In the
context of CO2, CCS’s high capital costs may make end-of-pipe opportunities less relevant.
In order to measure the additional costs of using an input-based regulation, one would
need to be able to estimate the marginal abatement cost for all techniques. Figure 1 depicts
how these costs might be determined. As Metcalf and Weisbach (2009) note, a narrow
policy will miss out on some opportunities and will result in a steeper marginal abatement
cost curve. Figure 1 shows this in a slightly diﬀerent way. The horizontal axis shows
the overall amount of abatement required, aggregating over all polluters, by the policy b A.
The left vertical axis maps input-based marginal abatement costs, MACin,a si ne q u a t i o n
(7). The right vertical axis represents the marginal costs only for end-of-pipe abatement,








In other words, MACend accounts for the abatement options resulting from changing r.
Where the marginal costs equate (MACin = MACend)a tA∗, ﬁrms achieve the least cost
option. The shaded area shows the additional costs (AddCost)t h a tﬁrms incur by only








Under the theoretical assumptions above, ﬂexibility achieves the lowest overall costs. As
a starting point, downstream regulation appears the cost eﬀective policy. Furthermore,
dynamic incentives may exacerbate this ﬁnding. Firms would have incentive to develop,
and invest in, new end-of-pipe abatement technologies if the carbon price were on emissions
but not if they face an input-based policy.
63 Three Main Concerns of Vertical Targeting
However, regulating at the source of pollution may fail to realize these gains from trade
for several reasons. This section highlights three: transactions costs, leakages, and oﬀsets.
Transaction costs recognize that monitoring and enforcement become more complex when
a vertical segment includes many polluters. Leakage occurs when unregulated ﬁrms emit
more because of the policy. Vertical targeting will aﬀect leakage: unregulated ﬁrms in some
vertical links will be more price elastic than others. Upstream policies coupled with oﬀsets
may allow for cost eﬀectiveness. However, asymmetric information could result in greater
emissions and greater costs with oﬀsets than without them. The following section discusses
some other issues that have been raised on this issue.
3.1 Transactions Costs
Transactions costs pose a major hurtle for establishing an end-of-pipe regulation: The cost of
monitoring and enforcing regulation for millions of pollution sources could dwarf the beneﬁts
from some downstream regulations. In contrast, a regulation upstream of pollution sources
could substantially reduce these costs. Metcalf and Weisbach (2009) note that regulating a
few thousand fossil-fuel producing companies would account for 80 percent of GHG emissions
in the US. By including some select non-fossil polluters, an additional 10 percent of total
emissions would be regulated. Metcalf and Weisbach (2009) argue that the transactions
c o s t so fa d d i n gt h e s ep o l l u t e r sw o u l db em o d e s t .
I modify the theory from the previous section to account for these costs. Suppose that
regulators incur a cost κ in determining emissions from each source. In addition, monitoring
the usage and carbon content of each fuel also results in costs. For simplicity, assume the
same constant cost κ that society incurs on each input supplier. Furthermore, assume that
the decision to regulate upstream or downstream—i.e., input-based or end of pipe—is jointly
determined for all n pollution sources and m fuel suppliers. A regulator trying to minimize
costs now faces a trade oﬀ: regulate end of pipe and incur costs nκ; or regulate inputs and
incur higher abatement costs and some transactions costs AddCost + mκ. N o t et h a ti f
m>n , then end-of-pipe regulation will always be lower cost (assuming similar transactions
costs per ﬁrm).
As discussed in the motor vehicle example at the start of this chapter, many segments
in the vertical chain could be regulated. In order to minimize overall costs, regulators may
7consider all V options, where V equals the number of vertical links associated with carbon
emissions from one particular sector or industry. Let v∗ solve the cost minimization problem:
v
∗ =a r g m i n
v∈{1,..,V }
{AddCostv + lvκ}, (10)
where lv equals the number of agents in segment v (e.g., n or m). Note that for the polluting
segment, AddCost =0 .
In general, moving further upstream (or downstream) from the source of pollution results
in forgoing some abatement opportunities. Hence, I expect AddCost to increase monoton-
ically with vertical distance from the pollution source. However, the number of regulated
ﬁrms may increase or decrease along the vertical chain. In the vehicle example, while the
number of vehicles vastly exceeds reﬁneries, more ﬁrms extract oil worldwide than own US
reﬁneries.
Finally, note that transactions costs depend on technology. In the future, technology
will likely improve such that collecting and using information for enforcement becomes even
easier. As a result, the cost of regulating more complex vertical levels will likely fall;
regulating 250 million vehicles may become feasible. In other words, the optimal vertical
targeting of regulation may change over time.
3.2 Leakage
Leakage poses a second major concern of upstream versus downstream regulation. If all
nations do not harmonize carbon prices, then incomplete regulation will aﬀect the types
of goods produced and consumed. Leakage occurs when partial regulation results in an
increase in emissions in unregulated parts of the economy.6 The vertical targeting of the
policy will aﬀect the magnitude of leakage. Here, leakage could be an issue with either
upstream or downstream regulation.
Deﬁne the market demand for a good as QD(p).W ec a nw r i t et h er e s i d u a ld e m a n df o r
regulated ﬁrms’ output as: QDR(p)=QD(p) − QSU(p),w h e r eQSU represents the supply of
ﬁrms not regulated. In particular, QSU will include output from foreign ﬁrms. Note that
not all foreign production need be unregulated, as ﬁrms in some countries already face a
6Many recent papers examine leakage. For example, Fowlie (2009) develops a theory of incomplete
regulation. She shows how leakage can, in some cases, increase total emissions relative to no regulation,
and in other cases, decrease emissions relative to full regulation. Bushnell and Chen (2009) simulate the
Western US electricity grid to examine how various proposals on how permits are allocated would aﬀect the
degree of leakage.
8carbon price. In addition, many policy proposals include a discussion of border adjustments
(for example, see Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009). Fischer and Fox (2009) compare the eﬀects
on leakage of border taxes versus rebates.
Decomposing market demand into its two components—QDR(p) and QSU(p)—is useful in
understanding the relationship between leakage and vertical targeting. In particular, if
market prices increase in equilibrium, residual demand for domestic ﬁrms will fall for two
reasons. Consumers buy less, which reduces emissions, but also foreign ﬁrms produce more
which will increase emissions. These unregulated emissions cause damage. If marginal
damages are (locally) constant and equal the carbon price τ, then regulating segment v will
result in additional damages (AddDmg):







where e F and e r represent unregulated ﬁrms’ fuel carbon content and end-of-pipe emissions
rate, and p1 and p0 denote the price of good v with and without regulation, respectively. All
else equal, a policy that aims at the part of the vertical chain with the least elastic foreign
supply will result in the greatest welfare.
This also applies to a multiproduct setting. When close substitutes, more leakage occurs
in markets for unregulated goods. In general, more precisely deﬁned markets will have
greater substitutes so ﬁne-tuned regulations may cause greater leakage. Note that this
perspective has focused narrowly on the prices of the regulated good. In a general equilibrium
setting, prices throughout the vertical chain, and in the rest of the economy, will also be
aﬀected. As such, leakage could occur in many industries.
One particular type of leakage deserves further examination. Reshuﬄing occurs when
ﬁrms do not change production (ﬁrms’ location, output, and methods stay ﬁxed), but do
change where they sell the goods. In electricity markets, reshuﬄing may occur if regulation
requires LSEs to document the sources of purchased power (Bushnell, Peterman, and Wol-
fram, 2008). Unlike leakage, where the location and amount of production of carbon-intensive
goods physically changes, reshuﬄing looks more like an accounting exercise. Producers sell
the relatively clean power to the regulated LSEs and the relatively dirty power to others.
For goods where transportation is inherently diﬃcult to track, like electricity, regulators may
ﬁnd reshuﬄing particularly problematic.
Regulators face the issue of reshuﬄing for other goods with heterogeneous carbon intensi-
ties. Within biofuels, for example, some fuels have carbon rates well below that of oil, while
9others may exceed crude’s carbon content. Even with consumer goods, heterogeneity arises
due to production technology diﬀerences. Suppose that an import tariﬀ were enacted, and
regulators could accurately measure the carbon content of the imported goods. We would
expect that some reshuﬄing would take place with only the clean goods coming to the US,
and the dirty goods staying in the other country. Unlike with leakage, emissions may not
increase with reshuﬄing.7 However, import tariﬀs will only apply to the cleanest goods in
equilibrium, limiting their eﬀectiveness in reducing emissions.
3.3 Oﬀsets
If regulators decide to use upstream regulation, they may consider giving ﬁrms credit for
choosing options that reduce GHGs downstream. Regulators oﬀer oﬀset programs to lower
overall abatement costs while still reducing emissions to a set level (i.e., the cap). However,
asymmetric information may cause unintended consequences.
Suppose that regulators have imperfect information regarding how much ﬁrms would emit
without regulation (i.e., the baseline). Deﬁne e ≡ qFr as regulators’ expected baseline.
Firms have private information; they know the actual unregulated emissions e0.A f t e r
opting in, regulators and ﬁrms observe actual emissions e ≡ qFr. Finally, I denote actual
abatement as α ≡ e0 − e, and regulators’ expected abatement as α ≡ e − e.
The objective function for ﬁrms facing input-based regulation with oﬀsets is:
max
q,F,r
π = P(Q)q − c(q) − tinFq− ain(q,F) − aout(q,F,r)+σ(r,e). (12)
The subsidy σ commonly takes the form of pollution credits for perceived abatement α.
Regulated ﬁrms can use oﬀset credits in lieu of using pollution permits, and thus equal the
carbon price in equilibrium: σ(r,e)=tinα.
Asymmetric information over α can result in adverse selection (Montero, 1999). Unlike
with an end-of-pipe regulation, ﬁr m sh a v eac h o i c et oo p ti n t oa no ﬀset program. For a
continuous, diﬀerentiable abatement technology, a ﬁrm will opt in if the marginal subsidy
exceeds the marginal abatement costs, ∂σ/∂r > ∂aout/∂r. If marginal abatement costs lie
below the carbon price tin, then such adoption could lower total abatement costs across all
ﬁrms.
7If ﬁrms reshuﬄe through electronic transfers, then emissions will not increase. On the other hand, if
reshuﬄing requires that goods be physically moved to diﬀerent locations, this would (presumably) increase
emissions due to additional transportation.
10Regulators will likely either understate or overstate baseline emissions e0,a n dboth cases
may lead to adverse eﬀects. First, if e falls substantially below e0,t h e naﬁrm with low
marginal abatement costs may lack the incentive to reduce r. Even though the ﬁrm could
reduce emissions at low social costs, the subsidy would be insuﬃcient to provide it with
incentives to do so. This type of error will result in forgone cost savings to society. However,
these opportunities would also be missed in an input-based regulation without oﬀsets.
The second type of error could actually increase social costs relative to a no oﬀset regime.
In this case, a particularly lucrative subsidy may entice even a ﬁrm with high marginal
abatement costs to opt in. This will occur if the regulator substantially overstates the
baseline emissions, e>e 0. Given continuous and diﬀerentiable abatement costs, a ﬁrm
could abate just a small amount, |∆r| <ε , and receive a large subsidy. The number of
credits awarded equal the perceived abatement, α>0, even though actual abatement α is
near zero. In this case, when virtually no actual abatement occurs, society incurs no costs
(even those ﬁrms receive transfers).
However, for “lumpy” investments, this type of error can result in costs to society. Lumpi-
ness may result from a technological characteristic (CCS may have large capital costs and
low marginal costs), or a policy (if regulators can only monitor large changes in r). In either
case, ﬁrms must now either make a large investment or none at all.
Oﬀs e t sp r o v i d en e tb e n e ﬁts to society equal to the actual value created (i.e., the carbon
price times actual abatement) less the ﬁrms’ abatement costs: tinα − aout.U n d e r a c o s t
eﬀective policy, ﬁrms abate only if the social beneﬁts exceed social costs. If e0 = e,o ﬀsets
would be cost eﬀective. However, ﬁrms with larger predicted baselines, e>e 0,m a yh a v e
incentive to abate even if doing so reduces social welfare. Even with unbiased estimates,
measurement error in the regulators’ perceived baseline results in higher costs due to adverse
selection. To see this, note that a ﬁrm will opt in only if it receives payments greater than
cost, tinα>a out.T h u s ,o ﬀsets increase abatement costs when ﬁrms have incentive to opt
(tinα>a out) in even though doing so results in a net losses to society (tinα<a out), or:
tinα>a out >t inα. (13)
Some high-cost ﬁrms will opt in, and some low-cost ﬁrms will opt out.8
8Note that these distortions can persist in the long run as the subsidy reduces the permit price below the
cost eﬀective price τout.
11Furthermore, oﬀsets can result in a form of leakage.9 If ﬁrms abate α but earn credits
for α, then overall emissions increase by α − α. These additional emissions increase the
damages associated with climate change. If damages are locally linear, and if marginal
damages equal the carbon price, then these additional emissions cost society tin · (α − α).
Combining the net beneﬁts from oﬀsets with the damages from additional emissions, one




{[−(tinα − aout)+tin · (α − α)] · 1[tinα>a out]}, (14)
where 1[·] indicates opting in. Note that OffLoss may be positive or negative.
While regulators cannot observe e0 for each ﬁrm, they may know its distribution. In this
case, the expected net losses from oﬀsets, E[OffLossv], can help determine the least costly
policy. Combining all four components—cost eﬀectiveness, transactions costs, leakage, and
oﬀsets—the link v∗∗ minimizes total social costs:
v
∗∗ =a r g m i n
v∈{1,..,V }
{AddCostv + lvκ + AddDmgv + E[OffLossv]}. (15)
4 Other Issues of Vertical Targeting
Next I brieﬂy discuss several other issues that have been raised in the context of upstream
versus downstream regulation. These include imperfect competition, regulatory treatment,
tax salience, and integrating markets.
4.1 Imperfect Competition
With regards to upstream regulation, some raise a concern that imperfect competition am-
pliﬁes carbon price pass through. In particular, some argue that input-based carbon prices
will be marked up repeatedly in a chain of industries with market power. In contrast, they
posit, a downstream carbon price will only aﬀect the last segment of the chain.
Consider three issues regarding imperfect competition and carbon price pass through.
First, while ﬁrms with market power have incentives to increase prices above marginal costs,
this does not imply that an additional carbon cost will increase market prices by more than
9This occurs only if regulators tie the oﬀset program to the cap-and-trade regulation. However, if
separate government subsidies or voluntary markets fund oﬀsets, and regulated ﬁrms cannot use these oﬀsets
for compliance, then the additional supply of oﬀsets will not reduce abatement in the regulated market.
12the additional cost. Firms optimize by setting marginal revenue equal to marginal costs, and
the slope of marginal revenue may be either greater or less than the slope of inverse demand.
Second, when ﬁrms exert market power the theory of the second best applies and the optimal
tax need not equal marginal damages (see, for example, Buchanan (1969)). Third, with
ﬁxed proportions (whereby ﬁrms cannot substitute other inputs to change emissions, i.e.,
r = r), upstream and downstream regulation will result in the same equilibrium. Chiu,
Mansley, and Morgan (1998) refer to this as the irrelevance result.
To see this last point, I use an example of a chain of imperfectly competitive industries. In
particular, suppose that a monopolist in one market sells to another downstream monopolist,
who then sells to customers. The upstream ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts (πu) by producing qu at an
input price w.T h e u p s t r e a m ﬁrm incurs costs c(qu). The downstream ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts
(πd)b yp r o d u c i n gqd,f o rw h i c hc o n s u m e r sp a yp.T h e d o w n s t r e a m ﬁrm pays wqu + k(qd).
Using notation from the previous sections, the regulator will impose either an input-based
or an end-of-pipe carbon price. The resulting proﬁt functions equal:
πu = w(qu)qu − c(qu) − tinrFqd
πd = p(qd)qd − wqu − k(qd) − τoutrFqd





0q = w + k
0 + τoutr,
or rearranging terms, the downstream ﬁrm’s response function as w = p + p0q − k0 − τoutr.







00q = tinr + τoutr. (16)
Note that if r = r , then an upstream carbon price equates to downstream policy.10
4.2 Regulation
Metcalf and Weisbach (2009) discuss how regulated industries may treat upstream and down-
stream policies diﬀerentially. For example, if electric utilities face direct, end-of-pipe reg-
ulation and receive grandfathered permits, then regulators may limit their ability to pass
10For perfectly competitive downstream markets, ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order condition imply w = p − k0 − τoutr.
The upstream monopolist maximizes proﬁts by solving p + p0q − c0 − k0 − k00q = tinr + τoutr. Again, the
policies are equivalent. Chiu et al. (1998) reach the same conclusion for an upstream monopolist selling to
downstream Cournot oligopolists.
13on marginal cost increases: the opportunity cost of permits in hand may not be treated
the same as a purchased permits. In contrast, the same utility may easily pass on higher
input prices under upstream regulation. Note that from a social welfare perspective, fully
incorporating increases in marginal costs in determining the market equilibrium price will
be eﬃcient. Namely, the optimal price would be where marginal social costs equal marginal
social beneﬁts, not where price equals average costs.
4.3 Tax Salience
Some promote downstream regulation by arguing that a carbon price near the point of
emissions (e.g., power plants or gasoline stations) will make the policy more salient for the
polluter, and therefore, result in greater response. This argument stems from ﬁndings of
behavioral economists, who posit that consumers respond more to easily-computed taxes.
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) look at state-level alcohol consumption from 1970-2003.
They ﬁnd a greater change in consumption with taxes already included in the shelf price
(excise taxes) than with taxes applied at the point of sale (sales taxes). Consumers ﬁnd
those taxes already imbedded in the price of the good to be the most salient. Note that these
ﬁndings suggest that any policy in which ﬁrms account for carbon costs in the “shelf” price
(whether it be because of an increase in fuel prices from input-based regulation or because of
an increase in marginal costs directly from an end-of-pipe regulation) would be more eﬀective
at changing end-users’ behavior than a carbon price placed on consumers afterwards.
4.4 Integrating Markets
The optimal vertical segment of regulation for one emissions source’s vertical chain may
diﬀer across sources. For example, regulating reﬁneries may minimize costs in the case of
vehicles’ carbon while emission source regulation may minimize costs for stationary facilities.
In integrating these diﬀerent regulations, it will be important, from a cost eﬀective per-
spective, that chains do not “cross.” Namely, cost eﬀectiveness will fail if ﬁrms pay the
carbon price more than once: for example, if a reﬁnery faces a carbon price and then sells
its fuel oil to a power plant already paying for emissions, then the outcome will not be least
cost. On the other hand, in integrating regulations across markets, establishing trading
ratios so that reﬁneries and power plants can trade permits (in dollars per ton of carbon
dioxide, for example) will enable greater gains and lower overall costs. If power plants can
14reduce emissions at a lower marginal cost than can a reﬁnery, then allowing ﬁrms to trade
across sectors will lower overall costs.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This chapter sets out some key issues in deciding what level of a vertical chain of industries
to target in designing regulation. After developing a model of cost eﬀectiveness, the chapter
examines several reasons why potential gains from trade may not be realized. First, upstream
regulation could substantially reduce transactions costs. Regulating a few thousand fossil-
fuel producing companies would account for 80 percent of GHG emissions (Metcalf and
Weisbach, 2009). Second, if all nations do not harmonize carbon prices, then incomplete
regulation will aﬀect the types of goods produced, traded, and consumed. The magnitude
of regulatory leakage depends on whether policy regulates ﬁrms upstream or downstream.
Third, oﬀsets have been considered in order to give ﬁrms facing upstream regulation with
the incentive to choose some downstream options to reduce emissions. While these oﬀsets
may result in lower overall abatement costs, they may also have unintended consequences
that result in less overall abatement (Montero, 1999). This chapter discusses how cost
eﬀectiveness, transactions costs, leakage, and oﬀsets relate to the issue of regulatory vertical
segment selection.
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Figure 1: Depiction of Marginal Abatement Costs broken into Input-based and other, 
End-of-Pipe Abatement.  The horizontal axis is the total amount of abatement 
required under the cap.  The shaded area is the additional costs incurred by 
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